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2021

## Heterogeneous coalitions and social revolutions

(Article in press ?)

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### Abstract

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We have explained the presence of heterogeneous winning coalitions in social revolutions. In an overcrowded agrarian society, two almost identical non-productive enforcers, the landed political elite, collude and bargain over transfers with one of the two peasants to contest over a piece of land, as property rights for land are not well defined. In any other scenario, neither the grand coalition nor the coalition of two peasants and one enforcer forms, thereby deposing the other enforcer with positive probability. So, social revolutions never occur. If foreign wars weaken an enforcer, such as in China (1911), France, and Russia, adding one unit of capital makes the coalition of the peasant, the now worker, and one of the enforcers (now an industrial political elite) attractive: The excess labor can work with it; the weaker enforcer retaliates less and the stronger one more, if excluded. However, if the weaker one (the still-landed political elite) proposes first, a grand coalition forms in which he or she gets less than the other members do (desertion). There is conflict among peasants and among landed elites; thus, the concept of a coalition is more appropriate than that of a class. © The Author(s) 2021.

### SciVal Topic Prominence ⓘ

Topic: Suffrage | Dictator | Autocracy

Prominence percentile: 74.024 ⓘ

### Author keywords

[bargaining](#) [Coalitions](#) [social revolutions](#) [Tullock contest](#)

### Funding details

#### Funding text

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The author received partial financial support from Universidad de Lima.

ISSN: 10434631

Source Type: Journal

Original language: English

DOI: 10.1177/10434631211001576

Document Type: Article

Publisher: SAGE Publications Ltd

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