https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12724/20528 2026-05-13T08:42:24Z 2026-05-13T08:42:24Z Sánchez Dávila, Elmer Riquelme, Andrés https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12724/24453 2026-04-16T17:01:27Z 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z

Mineral price shocks on macroeconomic aggregates in a highly dependent small open economy: Evidence from Peru, 2003–2024 Sánchez Dávila, Elmer; Riquelme, Andrés The aim of this paper is to estimate the effects of a mineral price shock on macroeconomic aggregates in a small open economy that is highly dependent on mineral exports, such as Peru. The paper considers two key features of the Peruvian mining industry: its polymetallic nature and the cyclical phases of price fluctuations. The former allows for the development of a Mineral Price Index (MPI), while the latter enables the testing of structural breaks, which facilitates the use of a Time-Varying Parameter Vector Autoregressive (TVP-VAR) model. Our results indicate that a shock to the MPI has a significant effect of 11.5 % on GDP and 15.5 % on overall inflation. However, the impact varies depending on the phase of MPI fluctuations. These findings underscore the importance of having flexible policy responses to mitigate the effects of future mineral price shocks and highlight the role that mineral price fluctuations play in shaping Peru's macroeconomic performance, particularly during boom periods. This paper also contributes to filling the gap in the local empirical literature regarding these two aspects of the Peruvian mining industry.

2025-01-01T00:00:00Z Urbina Padilla, Dante Abelardo Caceres Bautista, Nicole Ariana https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12724/24432 2026-04-16T17:01:27Z 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z

Multidimensional and monetary poverty in Peru: Evidence of their evolution, determinants, and the impact of the pandemic Urbina Padilla, Dante Abelardo; Caceres Bautista, Nicole Ariana The COVID-19 outbreak has left a profound economic aftermath, disrupting decades of consistent progress in poverty reduction in several countries. In this context, it is relevant to study the Peruvian economy since it experienced one of the highest COVID-19 mortality rates globally, its GDP declined by 11% and its monetary poverty rate rose to 30%, a situation not observed since 2010. Therefore, to better understand Peru’s socioeconomic landscape after the pandemic, we construct a Multidimensional Poverty Index during the period 2019-2022 and compare it with monetary poverty using data sourced from the National Household Survey. We find that the latter was more volatile than multidimensional poverty. Employing logistic panel regressions, consistent patterns emerge in terms of the signs and statistical significance of the marginal effects for both poverty measurements across various weighting structures and poverty cutoffs. For instance, certain demographic groups, including rural women, those with only primary education, the unemployed and informal workers, exhibit a significantly heightened probability of experiencing both monetary and multidimensional poverty. The pandemic also increased the likelihood of experiencing both types of poverty across all scenarios considered. Conversely, individuals of mestizo ethnicity and those with higher education levels demonstrate a reduced likelihood of experiencing both types of poverty.

2025-01-01T00:00:00Z Hernández Breña, Wilson Virgilio https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12724/22594 2026-04-16T17:01:27Z 2017-01-01T00:00:00Z

Gerencialismo en un ambiente de regulaciones débiles y cultura fuerte: El caso de las Fiscalías Corporativas en Perú Hernández Breña, Wilson Virgilio En el Perú, la corporativización llegó en el 2011a las Fiscalías Especializadas en Delitos de Corrupción de Funcionarios (en adelante, FC Corporativas Corporativas), luego de un supuesto éxito en la jurisdicción civil. Priorizando la eficiencia por encima de la calidad, esta medida gerencialista planteó compartir tareas administrativas y jurídicas entre los distintos fiscales, bajo el liderazgo de un fiscal coordinador. En los hechos, la corporativización estuvo lejos de alcanzar la eficiencia. En este artículo, analizamos cómo la generalidad de las reglas establecidas para el funcionamiento de las FC Corporativas y los rasgos de una cultura fiscal que desvaloriza lo corporativo en forma insidiosa, crearon incentivos que generaron la aparición de cuatro estilos de gestión directamente influenciados por dos características delos fiscales coordinadores (comunicación y proactividad). Asumiendo que la cultura fiscal crea nuevos incentivos, especialmente en escenarios de transición (hacia la corporativización y hacia la adopción de un nuevo Código Procesal Penal), no exaltamos la cultura ni damos única cabida a una mejor regulación como eje de solución. Sostenemos que la comprensión de la interacción entre regulaciones y cultura fiscal brinda un mejor espacio de trabajo para políticas públicas que busquen la eficiencia pero también la calidad del trabajo de los fiscales.

2017-01-01T00:00:00Z Nieva Chávez, Ricardo https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12724/22532 2026-04-16T17:01:27Z 2024-01-01T00:00:00Z

Explaining mobilization for revolts by private interests and kinship relations. A comment on Armandola, Doehne and Rost Nieva Chávez, Ricardo The authors study the role of kinship relationships in explaining mobilization for a revolt in Basel, Switzerland, in 1691; rebels consisted of a weaker fraction of the elite and individuals with citizen rights. The empirical section shows that revolts are mainly driven by the elite’s distant kin rather than the rebels’ close kin. Allowing for coalition formation, as in the new theory of corruption, conflict, and inequality proposed in this comment, can give an alternative explanation. In the first formal model, we assume “elite” corresponds to the term “enforcer” in the new theory. This is a nonproductive individual who is the strongest in terms of fighting against peasants over a prize in a contest. In this simple model, there are no other players. Thus, this framework predicts that the only rebels would come from within the elite. Historical evidence shows that the marginal elite got stronger relatively and, thus, excluded the oligarchy from the winning coalition to take over the government. The direct application of this model would imply that non-elite members were not part of the rebellion. However, the historical facts presented by Armandola et al. show that non-elite citizens also participated in the revolt. To match these facts in Armandola et al., we allow informally individuals with citizen rights to participate in the rebellion. Peasants, a term also used in the new theory, and marginalized groups (a term only used in the commented paper) in the cities did not participate. Kinship effects are discussed. © The Author(s) 2024.

2024-01-01T00:00:00Z