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dc.contributor.authorNieva Chávez, Ricardo
dc.contributor.otherNieva Chávez, Ricardo
dc.date.accessioned2018-09-24T19:44:52Z
dc.date.available2018-09-24T19:44:52Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.citationNieva, R. (2019). Corruption and paradoxes in alliances. Economics of Governance, 20(1), 41-71. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-018-0213-4en
dc.identifier.issn14356104
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12724/6861
dc.descriptionIndexado en Scopuses_PE
dc.description.abstractIn order to study corruption when a person can adjudicate over property rights, we extend the Tullock contest model by letting identical workers and a non-productive enforcer, who is more effective at fighting, contest over a resource. Property rights for output are well defined, but it is not so for the resource. If the enforcer assigns the resource in the way he was mandated, then the grand coalition forms with no corruption. There is corruption if he colludes with a subset of the workers and gets a transfer; this coalition then fights over the resource against other groups of workers. For general cost effort functions, if the enforcer is effective enough and marginal productivity of labor is adequately low, addition of the enforcer to a coalition increases the sum of payoffs of its members and generates negative externalities on other coalitions; that is, to divide and rule becomes an attractive prospect. This matches the empirical association between corruption and labor productivity or income inequality.es_PE
dc.formatapplication/pdfes_PE
dc.language.isospaes_PE
dc.publisherSpringer Verlages_PE
dc.relation.ispartofurn:issn:14356104
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.sourceUniversidad de Limaes_PE
dc.sourceRepositorio Institucional - Ulimaes_PE
dc.subjectAlianzas estratégicas (Negocios)es_PE
dc.subjectCorrupción en las empresases_PE
dc.subjectCorporate corruptiones_PE
dc.subjectStrategic alliances (Business)es_PE
dc.subject.classificationCiencias empresariales y económicas / Economíaes_PE
dc.titleCorruption and paradoxes in allianceses_PE
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.otherArtículo en Scopuses_PE
ulima.areas.lineasdeinvestigacionDesarrollo empresarial / Estrategias y comportamiento empresariales_PE
dc.identifier.journalEconomics of Governancees_PE
dc.publisher.countryDEes_PE
dc.description.peer-reviewRevisión por pareses_PE
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-018-0213-4
ulima.autor.afiliacionDepartment of Economics, Universidad de Limaes_PE
ulima.autor.carrera(No se cuenta con información oficial)es_PE
dc.identifier.isni0000000121541816


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