Now showing items 1-2 of 2

    • Corruption and paradoxes in alliances 

      Nieva-Chávez, Ricardo (Springer VerlagAlemania, 2019)
      Acceso restringido
      In order to study corruption when a person can adjudicate over property rights, we extend the Tullock contest model by letting identical workers and a non-productive enforcer, who is more effective at fighting, contest ...
    • Heterogeneous coalitions and social revolutions 

      Nieva-Chávez, Ricardo (SAGE PublicationsUS, 2021)
      Acceso restringido
      We have explained the presence of heterogeneous winning coalitions in social revolutions. In an overcrowded agrarian society, two almost identical non-productive enforcers, the landed political elite, collude and bargain ...