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dc.contributor.authorNieva-Chávez, Ricardo
dc.date.accessioned2021-05-20T15:43:10Z
dc.date.available2021-05-20T15:43:10Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.citationNieva, R., (2020). A Tragic Solution to the Collective Action Problem: Implications for Corruption, Conflict and Inequality. Nota di Lavoro. https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/a-tragic-solution-to-the-collective-action-problem-implications-for-corruption-conflict-and-inequality/es_PE
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12724/13098
dc.description.abstractWe study the role of an enforcer in the e§ectiveness of selective incentives in solving the collective action problem when groups take part in a contest. Cost functions exhibit constant elasticity of marginal e§ort costs. If prize valuations are homogeneous, our source of heterogeneity induces full costsharing and the Örst-best individual contributions; further, the group probability of winning goes up. With heterogeneity in prize valuations, an increase in the e§ectiveness of the enforcer in conáict increases the group probability of winning only if the prize valuation of the enforcer is lower than de Lehmer mean of those of the other players; however, the induced partial cost sharing is not group e¢ cient. If e§ectiveness "tends to inÖnity", the collective action problem is solved with partial cost-sharing if that prize valuation is not too low. Tragically, if productivity is low (if the prize is private in our set up) this occurs with corrupt coalitions which have been shown to form together with conáict and inequality endogenously; otherwise, this occurs with non corrupt coalitions. Further, even if such valuation is too low the group winning probability goes up. In this latter case, over cost-sharing yields group e¢ ciency.en_EN
dc.formatapplication/pdfes_PE
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Matteies_PE
dc.relation.urihttps://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/a-tragic-solution-to-the-collective-action-problem-implications-for-corruption-conflict-and-inequality/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_PE
dc.rightsAtribución 4.0 Internacional (CC BY 4.0)*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/*
dc.sourceRepositorio Institucional - Ulimaes_PE
dc.sourceUniversidad de Limaes_PE
dc.subjectCorrupciónes_PE
dc.subjectConflictos socialeses_PE
dc.subjectCorruption
dc.subjectSocial conflicts
dc.subject.classificationCiencias sociales / Procesos socialeses_PE
dc.titleA Tragic Solution to the Collective Action Problem: Implications for Corruption, Conflict and Inequalityen_EN
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees_PE
dc.publisher.countryIT
dc.description.peer-reviewRevisión por pareses_PE
dc.subject.ocdehttps://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.00es_PE


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